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world range from drug lords and insurgencies in the South American continent, failing states in the African continent, non-state actors and terrorist in the Asian continent, and nuclear posturing from nation states vying for a greater role in world stage. These conditions along with those brought on by forces of nature reflect the range of security concerns our nation's leadership is faced with today. The new security landscape requires a coordinated response from all elements of the United States (U.S>) instruments of national power. The interagency process required for such coordination does not exist. In turn, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as the most prepared of the interagency members, has found itself taking a larger role in operations of development and security assistance.
This research paper describes reasons why DOD has been the primary agency in the United States Government(USG) response in complex, in particular nation building, civil military campaigns. This research will show reasons why post conflict operations within the military realm of responsibility tend to creep outside this boundary including nation building. Initiatives and directives issued to correct deficiencies throughout the 1990s to the present will be discussed. A short comparative analysis of two military operations will highlight the need for an interagency planning, coordinating, and training mechanism. Finally, this report will show what the USG can do to start building a planning and coordination framework capable of providing an interagency response at the national level.
THE MILITARY IN THE INTERAGENCY: IMPROVING THE NATIONAL INTERAGENCY RESPONSE
"There is no strictly military solution to the problem we face…. It requires that we move together on the political front, on the economic front, on the reconstruction front in a manner that is synchronized and coordinated. If we don't do that, I do not believe that we can be successful. So you can pay the military to stay there, but you are only paying U.S. to stay forever."
General John Abizaid The list is as follows:
1. The people of the country in question must own the reconstruction process and be its prime movers.
2. A coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties' interests is crucial.
3. The international community must address the problem of post-conflict reconstruction holistically, building and deploying capacity to address a broad range of interrelated tasks.
4. Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction.
5. Success is made on the ground.
6. Needs must be rigorously prioritized and activities sequenced accordingly.
7. International interventions are extraordinary and should take all necessary measures to avoid undermining local leaders, institutions, and processes.
8. Mechanisms are needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate needed resources and sustain them for appropriate periods of time.
9. Accountability is essential for both host country and international actors.
10. The timing of an operation must be driven by circumstances on the ground, not by artificial deadlines or by externally driven bureaucratic imperatives. 2 His fourth principle addresses security. This principle in more detail states, "if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail." 3 Here lies the key as to why DOD has historically been the "catch all, do all" for complex operations requiring an interagency response. This report will look at reasons why DOD has been the primary agency in the United States Government (USG) response in complex emergencies and in particular nation-building civil-military campaigns. Bottom line is the USG interagency failed to implement affective changes to address lessons learned from operations in the post Cold War era. This research will show reasons why post-conflict operations within the military realm of responsibility tend to creep outside this boundary including nation-building.
Initiatives and directives issued to correct deficiencies throughout the 1990s to the present will be discussed. A short comparative analysis of two military operations will highlight the need for an interagency planning, coordinating, and training mechanism.
Finally, this report will show what the USG can do to start building a planning and coordination framework capable of providing an interagency response at the national level.
Why DOD?
Of Orr's 10 security principles mentioned above, his fourth principle, security, highlights two issues as to why DOD finds itself as the executing agency of most nation building responses for the USG. First, the UN and nations who would most likely be our coalition partners do not possess the capability to provide security on a large scale or in a quick, responsive manner. Only the U.S. has that capability through DOD. Second, in post conflict situations, the interagency and international response has been historically slow and chaotic. Inherently, the U.S. military is called on to commit more resources to the post conflict response. For the most part, the additional mission requirements have historically been requested without an adequate increase in the number of soldiers deployed.
The dilemma for commanders on the ground is deciding how to maintain security, rather than increase security, with less forces while task organizing for a mission at the opposite end of the full spectrum of conflict. Reassigning of units must take place at the expense of security. If security is lost rendering the area of operations too "hostile" for non-military personnel, the military will execute both the security and post conflict missions with very little support from civilian agencies. As Sarah Sewell points out, "If these other instruments of national power don't show up, can't stay, or aren't effective, the buck passes back to the military forces. Hence, until security can be assured for these diplomats very few will volunteer to go and none will be made to go." 4 Arguments from the State Department have been that putting its agents in place can only happen after the area is secure or "passive." These personnel and nation building organizations, they argue, do their work through diplomatic procedures not weapons. The other scenario is that the security situation becomes "passive" to allow the military to maintain a larger share of the post conflict mission requirements, thus becoming the deployable resource the civil agencies lack.
One reason the U.S. military finds itself in these situations is that it is forward deployed and is readily available. Along with its resources and its ability to execute operational level missions, the military often finds itself as the executing agency for many complex emergency operations long after combat has ceased. Nation building is a task the military has long avoided formally adding to its lexicon of tasks but has often found itself doing. The military in turn has referred to these tasks as "non-military" as found in LTC Nagl's foreword to the U.S. "Although in some cases individual agencies may undertake initial planning for a complex crisis, official interagency planning does not begin until the Deputies authorize it."
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In essence, work on the operational plan to coordinate and synchronize all the instruments of national power for a nation building operations does not begin until after the complex emergency arises and is understood well enough by the Deputies Committee to authorize work to begin. The handbook encourages planning by the individual agencies and states that the Pol-Mil planning is a "mechanism for harmonizing agency plans and actions" 13 At the operational level, military planners focus great amounts of time and energy on the most difficult part of planning which is the coordination and synchronization or "harmonizing" of the operation. Furthermore, this lack of prior coordination and planning allows for very little contingency planning at the interagency level. As the military has learned, "the enemy has a vote" and in complex contingency operations, the adversary, whether it is an insurgent or the weather, has a say in how operations will be conducted.
Options and experience gained from contingency planning and exercises conducted are 1. Do not allow senior DOD officials to ignore planning for postconflict situations; such planning will be critical in the new international environment.
2. Do not allow the planning process to be compartmentalized within DOD; postconflict situations have to be planned in a civilian-military interagency setting.
3. Do not bifurcate the process within DOD into war fighting and postconflict compartments; bifurcation is a prescription for ignoring the latter.
4. Do not assign the task within DOD to those who lack an understanding of the situation and the historical and cultural context; make use of expertise that exists.
5. Do not limit resources, particularly personnel that are necessary for effective planning.
6. Do not fail to review, review, and review the product.
Of the six lessons, four specifically are directed at DOD. Despite also acknowledging in the study that the interagency group, which DOD is one member, could drive the development of an integrated strategy for post conflict scenarios. 16 Other 17 In the conclusion section, the authors find that the military will continue to conduct missions in support of complex emergencies and, therefore; "must look beyond traditional roles to see how it can assist in rehabilitation and development."
In the end, the study does point out that the military has an important role to play in establishing stable civil society, but in the long term civil agencies must take the lead. In order for this transition to happen the authors call on military commanders to increase the involvement of Civil Affairs personnel into the planning process as early as possible. 18 Yet, the study never looks at this issue from the interagency perspective.
In the post 9/11 world, literature on the topic of post conflict and nation building continues to focus on DOD's role. In The Pentagon's New Map, Dr. Barnett describes
America as a "system-level power" within "the Core" of nation states which needs to develop a strategy to use its instruments of power as a "Sys-Admin force" to grow "the Core" and shrink "the Gap" between the nations of "haves and have nots." 19 Dr. Barnett states that he thinks the future management challenge for national security within the "interagency" has moved beyond "jointness" and cooperation amongst military services.
He also makes a point of saying that he believes DOD will change the least of all the agencies in the federal system. 20 DOD is already prepared to perform coordination and planning not just within its organization but with other agencies and governments as well. assumptions about the status of the country's political culture and infrastructure. 24 In
Panama, "Destabilizing developments that were not foreseen weakened the restoration efforts." 25 Of these destabilizing developments in Panama, the only difference from Iraq 13 years later was the lack of an organized and externally supported insurgency.
Despite the availability of Dr. Shultz's report, the lessons learned resulted in no change to address within the USG to address the problems identified. DOD decided post conflict operations were outside of their realm of responsibility beyond providing security and continued to focus on war fighting. The civilian agencies went to work on fixing the issues described without inclusion of DOD.
Despite having "Lessons Learned" from very similar case studies, the USG lacks the mechanisms required to exercise the civil-military interagency process to test the lessons it has learned and make the changes necessary to address these shortfalls.
"Lessons learned are only lessons learned if they result in changes to correct the problems identified in the lessons learned!" 26 The preceding quote from Dr. Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff is apropos to the situation. The USG needs to move to the next level of truly learning from the lessons and not merely acknowledging them. The inability to conduct comparative analysis highlights the need for an interagency post conflict training and planning mechanism to address these lessons. The mechanism would consist of situational training exercises where lessons learned can be reinforced and trained.
These exercises would be inclusive of all the agencies in the National Security Council, including DOD. This would allow civilian agencies to explore methods of dealing with know emergencies and complex situations and develop doctrine. This mechanism would also allow the interagency to achieve a better understanding of mission transition and responses available to given situations and would help to develop procedures on how to best transition from military to civilian operations.
The military must continue to focus on fighting our nation's wars. Having resources tied to establishing civil societies will eventually pose a threat to the military's ability to effectively respond to other missions which may arise in the full spectrum of The new definition of "war beyond warfare" entails that when our nation goes to war it will send more than its military. Lawyers, politicians, bankers, doctors, business leaders, and farmers, just to name a few, will be part of the integrated package required to affect the positive change necessary to promote development and stability. Today, this is taking place in Afghanistan in the form of Agricultural -Provincial Reconstruction
Teams. In this case, the National Guard Bureau was tasked to provide this assistance due to the fact that many soldiers in the National Guard are farmers. The National In an "era of persistent conflict," the USG cannot allow the environment to provide such a mechanism. 35 The nation must actively seek to improve the USG's capabilities to have a framework on which to plan and coordinate effective responses to post conflict and transition quickly and effectively to nation building operations. It must not squander the opportunity to bring the interagency into the operational planning and executing environment. The civil-military team can grow to provide an effective national response to the "wars beyond warfare" the U.S. will face in the future. COL Johnston, in the opening paragraph of his foreword to the Dr. Shultz
Panama study, captures this need accurately and in its entirety in 1993.
"In a more benign post-cold war international system, where no threat approaches that of the former Soviet Union, the rationale for the use of U.S. military power cannot be based solely on the national interest. It will have to reflect concern with and support for such issues as self-determination, democratization, human rights, and economic development. The United States must have a postconflict reconstruction assistance policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that promotes developments seen as contributing to stability and positive change. The use of force without a policy for the postconflict situation will be politically precarious." 36 Furthermore, the recommendations of the study Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:
Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era which focus on the NSC's role as the planning, coordinating, and approving mechanism in post conflict/nation building should be implemented. 37 The NSC needs to take the lead in these efforts and relieve DOD of this requirement. The NSC has access to all agencies and all elements of national power and is best suited to integrate strategy and develop the needed capabilities for nation building operations. This doctrine has to be formulated at the national level. The NSC could use DOD as the starting point and the framework that can be leveraged to build a doctrine and a planning and coordination process. The interagency, not just DOD, needs to effective in planning and responding to operations from Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement, and Post Conflict operations as well as complex emergencies that can arise anywhere including the realm of Homeland Security.
